跨考斯拉维尼亚语教学商量室刘先生提议大家初试过后，能够方便放松，能够看看泰国电视剧只怕感兴趣的英文信函电话电报子通信影，找找听斯洛伐克共和国（The Slovak Republic）语的感到。因为初试不考听力，所以大多数同校在复习时都把听力遗忘了，而过多学校在复试环节会调查听力，听力的增高却不是短暂能到位的，由此建议大家早点启幕练听力，而且保障每一日至少认真听15分钟。在看摄像、电视机剧娱乐之余，能够找肆、6级的听力题来做找找认为，做做托福[微博]、雅思[微博]的听力题，当然最棒是能找到所报名考试这个学校的每年复试真题，那样复习起来更有指向。接下来刘先生将报考大学生英语复试口语当中的科学普及难点以及答题技术给大家做三个简单的总计。
例如：My first job was a net supervisor in a small company. Although I worked there for only six months, I had wide experiences in 术语. But I gradually focused on(术语). So I took part in the Red Hat Authorization test and passed it with honor. In 2010, I was accepted by the Information Department, China Unicom，in charge of专业.
To be honest, this position brings me good salary and a promotion opportunity, however, I decided to apply for the Master of 术语… And that’s why I'm here. 20十年毕业在小商城做7个月网管，考取红帽中路认证(Red Hat Authorization)，经过三轮车面试，进入中国移动的消息化部录用，系统有限帮衬工程师。职业努力、报酬好、有进级机会。
办法一：说永世对的：Being open to new theories and new ideas is important, especially in telecommunications. Knowledge from 田野先生 work tells others what you can do, but that from theoretical studies tells others how you’re inventive, creative and sensible. I think postgraduate studies at this university can give me a mental power and realistic approach.接受新的论争、新思索、新的挑衅是很关键的，所以打算报考学士、职业中上学的学识来自经验，不过必须有理论的印证，才有再三再四提升
办法2：挑选1个熟知的，用本身的经验简述：The cutting-edge technology focuses on 自身会的术语. Its guideline is like this: A company needs a powerful machine, and wants to lower its cost. So as an engineer, I tried to put some out-of-date equipment and servers together. To do so, I had to use some integrated technology, for example, (用简写和代码代替：VM, WWK and AMX). 未来的前沿本领是…，其中央思虑为，公司远在资金节省，将某些快要淘汰的、低配置的装置只怕服务器通过软件手艺以逻辑的花样开始展览整合、以博取一台功效强大的高质量Computer，那样做，就亟须选取合成才能，如…
办法三：不提理论，说本人的天职：The team had to work round the clock and checked it up from time to time. In this way, the whole system wouldn’t crash. Other feedback mechanism includes术语(如有的常用的配备恐怕零部件名称：如servers, data base as well as hard disc)
直接说“笔者不明了”就足以了，别硬撑着：In this process, I’m in charge of the maintenance of servers. So my knowledge in 目生的园地is limited. Sorry, it is difficult for me to say more. But I know that it is important, and it is my plan to keep track of its latest trend. In this way, I can improve my analytical thinking and problem-solving abilities, especially during my postgraduate studies.由于自家在那一个职业经过中主要承担服务器维，其余世界的文化有关系，然而素不相识，但是本人也日渐发掘到它在专门的学业中的重要性，越发是在自己读研时期。
改专门的职业：I show keen interest in the law studies, the commercial and economic laws in particular, even though my major is Economics. You might ask me why, well, let’s tell you like this. Economics are too abstract, full of terms, far away from the real world. I don’t mean that economics is useless. But law studies seem more challenging, and promising for my future career. My plan is like this: start my work in a law firm and work as a lawyer so that I can try my best to help the clients, who they’re and where they’re from, whether they’re rich or poor. That’s why I made up my mind to change my major and applied for this law school. 小编对理学感兴趣，特别是国际法和经济法，尽管小编的正儿8经是占便宜，您大概问笔者何以该专门的学业，嗯，这么说呢，经济相比空虚，术语多，脱离现实世界。当然作者不是说经济并未有用，对它也平昔不偏见。可是本人以为农学更挑衅性，也更有前景：小编的陈设是：在律所开端作者的行事，尽己所能协理客户，无论他们是何人，来自何地，是身无分文照旧具有。所以本人决定改职业，申请科技学院。
I need to make a confession at the outset here. A little over 20 years
ago, I did something that I regret, something that I'm not particularly
proud of. Something that, in many ways, I wish no one would ever know,
but here I feel kind of obliged to reveal.
In the late 1980s, in a moment of youthful indiscretion, I went to law school.
In America, law is a professional degree: after your university degree, you go on to law school. When I got to law school, I didn't do very well. To put it mildly, I didn't do very well. I, in fact, graduated in the part of my law school class that made the top 90% possible.
Thank you. I never practiced law a day in my life; I pretty much wasn't allowed to.
But today, against my better judgment, against the advice of my own wife, I want to try to dust off some of those legal skills -- what's left of those legal skills. I don't want to tell you a story. I want to make a case. I want to make a hard-headed, evidence-based, dare I say lawyerly case, for rethinking how we run our businesses.
So, ladies and gentlemen of the jury, take a look at this. This is called the candle problem. Some of you might know it. It's created in 1945 by a psychologist named Karl Duncker. He created this experiment that is used in many other experiments in behavioral science. And here's how it works. Suppose I'm the experimenter. I bring you into a room. I give you a candle, some thumbtacks and some matches. And I say to you, "Your job is to attach the candle to the wall so the wax doesn't drip onto the table." Now what would you do?
Many people begin trying to thumbtack the candle to the wall. Doesn't work. I saw somebody kind of make the motion over here -- some people have a great idea where they light the match, melt the side of the candle, try to adhere it to the wall. It's an awesome idea. Doesn't work. And eventually, after five or ten minutes, most people figure out the solution, which you can see here.
The key is to overcome what's called functional fixedness. You look at that box and you see it only as a receptacle for the tacks. But it can also have this other function, as a platform for the candle. The candle problem.
I want to tell you about an experiment using the candle problem, done by a scientist named Sam Glucksberg, who is now at Princeton University, US, This shows the power of incentives.
He gathered his participants and said: "I'm going to time you, how quickly you can solve this problem." To one group he said, "I'm going to time you to establish norms, averages for how long it typically takes someone to solve this sort of problem."
To the second group he offered rewards. He said, "If you're in the top 25% of the fastest times, you get five dollars. If you're the fastest of everyone we're testing here today, you get 20 dollars." Now this is several years ago, adjusted for inflation, it's a decent sum of money for a few minutes of work. It's a nice motivator.
Question: How much faster did this group solve the problem?
Answer: It took them, on average, three and a half minutes longer. 3.5 min longer. This makes no sense, right? I mean, I'm an American. I believe in free markets. That's not how it's supposed to work, right?
If you want people to perform better, you reward them. Right? Bonuses, commissions, their own reality show. Incentivize them. That's how business works. But that's not happening here. You've got an incentive designed to sharpen thinking and accelerate creativity, and it does just the opposite. It dulls thinking and blocks creativity.
What's interesting about this experiment is that it's not an aberration. This has been replicated over and over again for nearly 40 years. These contingent motivators -- if you do this, then you get that -- work in some circumstances. But for a lot of tasks, they actually either don't work or, often, they do harm. This is one of the most robust findings in social science, and also one of the most ignored.
I spent the last couple of years looking at the science of human motivation, particularly the dynamics of extrinsic motivators and intrinsic motivators. And I'm telling you, it's not even close. If you look at the science, there is a mismatch between what science knows and what business does.
What's alarming here is that our business operating system -- think of the set of assumptions and protocols beneath our businesses, how we motivate people, how we apply our human resources-- it's built entirely around these extrinsic motivators, around carrots and sticks. That's actually fine for many kinds of 20th century tasks. But for 21st century tasks, that mechanistic, reward-and-punishment approach doesn't work, often doesn't work, and often does harm. Let me show you.
Glucksberg did another similar experiment, he presented the problem in a slightly different way, like this up here. Attach the candle to the wall so the wax doesn't drip onto the table. Same deal. You: we're timing for norms. You: we're incentivizing.
What happened this time? This time, the incentivized group kicked the other group's butt. Why? Because when the tacks are out of the box, it's pretty easy isn't it?
If-then rewards work really well for those sorts of tasks, where there is a simple set of rules and a clear destination to go to. Rewards, by their very nature, narrow our focus, concentrate the mind; that's why they work in so many cases. So, for tasks like this, a narrow focus, where you just see the goal right there, zoom straight ahead to it, they work really well.
But for the real candle problem, you don't want to be looking like this. The solution is on the periphery. You want to be looking around. That reward actually narrows our focus and restricts our possibility.
Let me tell you why this is so important. In western Europe, in many parts of Asia, in North America, in Australia, white-collar workers are doing less of this kind of work, and more of this kind of work. That routine, rule-based, left-brain work -- certain kinds of accounting, financial analysis, computer programming -- has become fairly easy to outsource, fairly easy to automate. Software can do it faster. Low-cost providers can do it cheaper. So what really matters are the more right-brained creative, conceptual kinds of abilities.
Think about your own work. Think about your own work. Are the problems that you face, or even the problems we've been talking about here, do they have a clear set of rules, and a single solution? No. The rules are mystifying. The solution, if it exists at all, is surprising and not obvious. Everybody in this room is dealing with their own version of the candle problem. And for candle problems of any kind, in any field, those if-then rewards, the things around which we've built so many of our businesses, don't work!
It makes me crazy. And here's the thing. This is not a feeling. Okay? I'm a lawyer; I don't believe in feelings. This is not a philosophy. I'm an American; I don't believe in philosophy.
This is a fact -- or, as we say in my hometown of Washington, D.C., a true fact.
Let me give you an example. Let me marshal the evidence here. I'm not telling a story, I'm making a case. Ladies and gentlemen of the jury, some evidence: Dan Ariely, one of the great economists of our time, he and three colleagues did a study of some MIT students. They gave these MIT students a bunch of games, games that involved creativity, and motor skills, and concentration. And the offered them, for performance, three levels of rewards: small reward, medium reward, large reward. If you do really well you get the large reward, on down.
葡京赌场88807手机平台，What happened? As long as the task involved only mechanical skill bonuses worked as they would be expected: the higher the pay, the better the performance. Okay? But once the task called for even rudimentary cognitive skill, a larger reward led to poorer performance.
Then they said, "Let's see if there's any cultural bias here. Let's go to Madurai, India and test it." Standard of living is lower. In Madurai, a reward that is modest in North American standards, is more meaningful there. Same deal. A bunch of games, three levels of rewards.
What happens? People offered the medium level of rewards did no better than people offered the small rewards. But this time, people offered the highest rewards, they did the worst of all. In eight of the nine tasks we examined across three experiments, higher incentives led to worse performance.
Is this some kind of touchy-feely socialist conspiracy going on here? No, these are economists from MIT, from Carnegie Mellon, from the University of Chicago. Do you know who sponsored this research? The Federal Reserve Bank of the United States. That's the American experience.
Let's go across the pond to the London School of Economics, LSE, London School of Economics, alma mater of eleven Nobel Laureates in economics. Training ground for great economic thinkers like George Soros, and Friedrich Hayek, and Mick Jagger.
Last month, just last month, economists at LSE looked at 51 studies of pay-for-performance plans, inside of companies. Here's what they said: "We find that financial incentives can result in a negative impact on overall performance."
There is a mismatch between what science knows and what business does. And what worries me, as we stand here in the rubble of the economic collapse, is that too many organizations are making their decisions, their policies about talent and people, based on assumptions that are outdated, unexamined, and rooted more in folklore than in science. And if we really want to get out of this economic mess, if we really want high performance on those definitional tasks of the 21st century, the solution is not to do more of the wrong things, to entice people with a sweeter carrot, or threaten them with a sharper stick. We need a whole new approach.
The good news is that the scientists who've been studying motivation have given us this new approach. It's built much more around intrinsic motivation. Around the desire to do things because they matter, because we like it, they're interesting, or part of something important. And to my mind, that new operating system for our businesses revolves around three elements: autonomy, mastery and purpose. Autonomy: the urge to direct our own lives. Mastery: the desire to get better and better at something that matters. Purpose: the yearning to do what we do in the service of something larger than ourselves. These are the building blocks of an entirely new operating system for our businesses.
I want to talk today only about autonomy. In the 20th century, we came up with this idea of management. Management did not emanate from nature. Management is not a tree, it's a television set. Somebody invented it. It doesn't mean it's going to work forever. Management is great. Traditional notions of management are great if you want compliance. But if you want engagement, self-direction works better.
Some examples of some kind of radical notions of self-direction. You don't see a lot of it, but you see the first stirrings of something really interesting going on, what it means is paying people adequately and fairly, absolutely -- getting the issue of money off the table, and then giving people lots of autonomy.
Some examples. How many of you have heard of the company Atlassian? It looks like less than half.
Atlassian is an Australian software company. And they do something incredibly cool. A few times a year they tell their engineers, "Go for the next 24 hours and work on anything you want, as long as it's not part of your regular job. Work on anything you want." Engineers use this time to come up with a cool patch for code, come up with an elegant hack. Then they present all of the stuff that they've developed to their teammates, to the rest of the company, in this wild and woolly all-hands meeting at the end of the day. Being Australians, everybody has a beer.
They call them FedEx Days. Why? Because you have to deliver something overnight. It's pretty; not bad. It's a huge trademark violation, but it's pretty clever.
That one day of intense autonomy has produced a whole array of software fixes that might never have existed.
It's worked so well that Atlassian has taken it to the next level with 20% time -- done, famously, at Google -- where engineers can spend 20% of their time working on anything they want. They have autonomy over their time, their task, their team, their technique. Radical amounts of autonomy. And at Google, as many of you know, about half of the new products in a typical year are birthed during that 20% time: things like Gmail, Orkut, Google News.
Let me give you an even more radical example of it: something called the Results Only Work Environment (the ROWE), created by two American consultants, in place at a dozen companies around North America. In a ROWE people don't have schedules. They show up when they want. They don't have to be in the office at a certain time, or any time. They just have to get their work done. How they do it, when they do it, where they do it, is totally up to them. Meetings in these kinds of environments are optional.
What happens? Almost across the board, productivity goes up, worker engagement goes up, worker satisfaction goes up, turnover goes down. Autonomy, mastery and purpose, the building blocks of a new way of doing things.
Some of you might look at this and say, "Hmm, that sounds nice, but it's Utopian." And I say, "Nope. I have proof." The mid-1990s, Microsoft started an encyclopedia called Encarta. They had deployed all the right incentives, They paid professionals to write and edit thousands of articles. Well-compensated managers oversaw the whole thing to make sure it came in on budget and on time. A few years later, another encyclopedia got started. Different model, right? Do it for fun. No one gets paid a cent, or a euro or a yen. Do it because you like to do it.
Just 10 years ago, if you had gone to an economist, anywhere, "Hey, I've got these two different models for creating an encyclopedia. If they went head to head, who would win?" 10 years ago you could not have found a single sober economist anywhere on planet Earth who would have predicted the Wikipedia model.
This is the titanic battle between these two approaches. This is the Ali-Frazier of motivation, right? This is the Thrilla in Manila. Intrinsic motivators versus extrinsic motivators. Autonomy, mastery and purpose, versus carrot and sticks, and who wins? Intrinsic motivation, autonomy, mastery and purpose, in a knockout.
Let me wrap up. There is a mismatch between what science knows and what business does. Here is what science knows. One: Those 20th century rewards, those motivators we think are a natural part of business, do work, but only in a surprisingly narrow band of circumstances. Two: Those if-then rewards often destroy creativity. Three: The secret to high performance isn't rewards and punishments, but that unseen intrinsic drive-- the drive to do things for their own sake. The drive to do things cause they matter.
And here's the best part. We already know this. The science confirms what we know in our hearts. So, if we repair this mismatch between science and business, if we bring our motivation, notions of motivation into the 21st century, if we get past this lazy, dangerous, ideology of carrots and sticks, we can strengthen our businesses, we can solve a lot of those candle problems, and maybe, maybe -- we can change the world.
I rest my case.